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THE MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
DOUBLE TAXATION IN INCOME AND INHERITANCE TAXES
The "Due Process" clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the
United States Constitution, in so far as it controls substantive laws
rather than procedure, requires such laws to be reasonable. The ques-
tion then arises, what constitutes reasonableness? When can a state
reasonably exercise taxing jurisdiction? Union Refrigerator Transit
Co. v. Kentucky' answers the question by applying the benefit theory
of taxation: where the taxpayer gets protection of his person and
property, or the value of such property becomes greater, or he is bene-
fited by the maintenance of public conveniences in which he shares,
such as roads, bridges or schools, the state then has the power to tax.
But if the taxing state is in no position to render these services or
benefits to the person or his property taxed, and the property is wholly
within the taxing power of another state to which it looks for protec-
tion, the taxing of such property is an extortion rather than a tax, and
is a taking of property without due process of law. In other words,
property which is wholly and exclusively within the jurisdiction of
another state receives none of the protection for which the tax is sup-
posed to be the compensation. Therefore, if the state is in no position
to render benefits to the object taxed, the exaction is unreasonable and
jurisdiction to tax does not exist.
The above standard is applied in determining the proper jurisdic-
tion of all forms of taxation. In the case of real estate, the state in
which the land lies is in a position to tax, for it can render protection
and benefit to the real estate.2 Likewise in taxing personalty, the state
where the tangible personalty is permanently situated can tax, for
that state gives protection to the property.3 The rule as to inheritance
taxes for tangible property is the same as the rule for property taxes:
the state where the property is located may tax, others may not.4
When we come to the question of income taxes, it is natural to feel
that the recipient of the income gets the benefit of protection and enjoy-
ment of the income from his domiciliary state, and therefore that state
should be allowed to tax it. On the other hand, the state where the
business is carried on, from which the income is derived, or the state
where the property is located, may tax on the theory that it is render-
ing services to the income-producing property.
'199 U.S. 194, 26 Sup. Ct. 36, 50 L.Ed. 150, 4 Ann. Cas. 493 (1905).2 Paddell v. City of New York, 211 U.S. 446, 29 Sup. Ct. 139, 53 L.Ed. 275,
15 Ann. Cas. 187 (1908).3 Old Dominion Steamship Co. v. Virginia, 198 U.S. 299, 25 Sup. Ct. 686, 49
L.Ed. 1059 (1905).4 Frick v. Pennsylvania, 268 U.S. 473, 45 Sup. Ct. 603, 69 L.Ed. 1058, 42 A.L.R.
316 (1925).
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The courts have recognized the taxing jurisdiction of both the
domiciliary state and that in which the business is located. Shaeffer v.
Carter5 holds that part of the income of a non-resident which was
derived from oil lands owned and operated within its boundaries was
taxable in Oklahoma, the state where the property was located. Maguire
v. Trefry6 permitted a tax on income received by one of its residents
as the beneficiary of a trust of intangibles, created and administered
in another state, because the resident receives benefits with regard to
the income, from his domicilary state. The income from a trust is to
be distinguished from the equitable interest in a trust which can not be
taxed in a domiciliary state if the object of the trust is in another state.7
It has also been held that a state might tax the income of a resident
although such income was earned in a business conducted outside of
the state." It is reasonable to conclude from the latter case that the
decision would not be otherwise, if the state in which the business was
located also taxed the income, derived from that business, thus allow-
ing multiple taxation which would approach double taxation.
In a recent case, New York ex rel. Cohn v. Graves,9 the taxpayer,
a resident of New York, owned real estate in New Jersey from which
she received rents as part of her income. New York taxed her entire
income and she was denied a refund of the tax on the portion which
was attributable to the rents from the New Jersey real estate. The
court here denies any double taxation, making a distinction between
a tax on the land and a tax on income from land, but no reference is
made to the possibility of both states taxing the income. The argument
is set forth that a state cannot tax real property beyond its bounds, and
that a tax on income derived from the real property is a tax on the
real property itself. It follows that if a state taxes the income from
real property beyond its jurisdiction, it is really taxing the property,
which it cannot do according to an accepted interpretation of the
Fourteenth Amendment. Pollack v. Farmers Loan & Trust Co.10 is
cited as authority for the proposition that a tax on income from real
estate is a tax on the real estate. The court denied that the Pollack v.
Farmers Loan & Trust Co."' case so held, but rather held that for
purposes of apportionment such a tax is a "direct tax;" and it did not
say it is a tax on the real estate.
5 252 U.S. 37, 40 Sup. Ct 221, 64 L.Ed. 445 (1920).
6253 U.S. 12, 40 Sup. Ct. 417, 64 L.Ed. 739 (1920).
7Safe Deposit & Trust Co. v. Virginia, 280 U.S. 83, 50 Sup. Ct. 59, 74 L.Ed.
180, 67 A.L.R. 386 (1929).
8 Lawrence v. State Tax Comm., 286 U.S. 276, 52 Sup. Ct. 556, 76 L.Ed. 1102,
87 A.L.R. 374 (1932).
9 300 U.S. 308, 57 Sup. Ct. 466, 81 L.Ed. 668 (1937).
10 157 U.S. 429, 15 Sup. Ct. 673, 39 L.Ed. 759 (1895).
11 Ibid.
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The issue as to whether double taxation will be tolerated was
brought squarely before the court in the case of Guaranty Trust Co. of
New York v. Virginia.' There was an imposition of an income tax
under a Virginia statute on income received by a resident of Virginia
as beneficiary of a discretionary trust established in New York, not-
withstanding the fact that the trustees had been required to pay a tax
on the income in New York under New York statutes. It was argued
that the tax was upon the same income and would amount to double
taxation and infringe the due process clause. Many of the cases cited
in this discussion were used to support that proposition. The court says:
"that those cases go on the theory that the taxing power of a state is
restricted to her confines and may not be exercised in respect of sub-
jects beyond them. Here, the thing taxed was receipt of income within
Virginia by a citizen residing there. The mere fact that another state
lawfully taxed funds from which the payments were made did not
necessarily destroy Virginia's right to tax something done within her
borders." The court cites Lawrence v. State Tax Commission" and
New York ex rel. Cohn v. Graves1 4 as authority and says there is no
distinction between the cases. The court apparently tolerates what
seems to be a double tax in income taxation.
As to the question of double taxation in inheritance taxes, two cases
that have recently been decided seem to weaken the rule set down in
Farmers Loan & Trust Co. v. Minnesota 5 in which the court held
that double taxation would not be tolerated in inheritance tax cases. A
debtor and a creditor state attempted to tax intangible property, and
the court held that only the creditor state, or the domicile of the owner
of the intangibles, could impose the tax. We now have two recent
decisions that hold that more than one state may levy inheritance taxes.
These decisions, of course, should be interpreted only with reference
to the fact-situations involved, although they give an indication of the
leanings of the court in any future double taxation questions.
In Curry v. McCanless,1 both Alabama and Tennessee were allowed
to impose death taxes upon the transfer of an interest in intangibles
which were held in trust by an Alabama trustee but passing under the
will of a deceased beneficiary domiciled in Tennessee. The decedent
reserved control of the trust during her life and power to revoke it by
will, which was not exercised. The court held that both the state in
which the trustee and trust are located and the state of the domicile
of the settlor may impose an inheritance tax. Four justices dissented.
'2305 U.S. 19, 59 Sup. Ct. 1, 83 L.Ed. 16 (1938).
13 Supra, note 11.
14 Supra, note 9.
15 280 U.S. 204, 50 Sup. Ct. 98, 74 L.Ed. 371, 65 A.L.R. 1000 (1930).16307 U.S. 357, 59 Sup. Ct. 900, 83 L.Ed. 1339 (1939).
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The court denies that authority requires the acceptance of the rule that
the Fourteenth Amendment precludes the taxation of any interest in
the same intangible in more than one state. The court states that when
the taxpayer extends his activities with respect to his intangible so as
to avail himself of the protection and benefit of the laws of two states,
and his person or property is within reach of the taxing authorities, the
reason for a single place of taxation no longer holds. The dissenting
opinion has the statement that legal title was in the trustee, and only
the state of the trustee has jurisdiction to tax.
In the companion case, Graves v. Elliot,'7 the same property is sub-
jected to an inheritance tax by two states, as above. Decedent created
a trust in Colorado. She reserved the power of revocation, but died
without having exercised such power. Prior to her death, the decedent
established a domicile in New York, while the trust continued to remain
in Colorado. Both New York and Colorado were allowed to tax, the
court basing its ruling on the reasoning in Curry v. McCanless.a' In
the dissenting opinion it was contended that there was an effective
localization of the intangibles in Colorado, and that the trustee held legal
title to such intangibles. The dissenting justices feel that only Colorado
should tax, and the principle of Mobilia sequunter personam must yield
to the established fact of legal ownership. The argument made in the
majority of opinions of Curry v. McCanless 9 and Graves v. Elliot"
seems applicable to the dissenting opinion of Blodget v. Silberman2l
and moves in the direction of implying the allowance of double taxa-
tion as in Blackstone v. Miller,2 2 which case Bladget v. SilberMan23
overruled.
The consideration of the cases wherein the right of several states
to impose income and inheritance taxes on the same object has been
determined reveals a definite tendency of the modem courts. A change
of ideas has taken place, possibly corresponding to the change of per-
sonnel in the United States Supreme Court. That tendency and change
in principles are toward judicial acknowledgment of the right of several
states to impose income and inheritance taxes on the same object. This
is an indication that the liberal viewpoint of the courts is encroaching
upon the doctrine of double taxation.
JOSEPH ZMLER.
17 307 U.S. 384, 59 Sup. Ct. 913, 83 L.Ed. 1359 (1939).28 Supra, note 16.
19 Ibid.20 Supra, note 17.
21277 U.S. 1, 48 Sup. Ct. 410, 72 L.Ed. 749 (1928).
22 188 U.S. 189, 23 Sup. Ct. 277, 47 L.Ed. 439 (1903).23 Supra, note 21.
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